The landmark judgment in Hiral P. Harsora and Ors. v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (Civil Appeal No. 10084 of 2016) addressed significant issues concerning the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDA). This case challenged the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the PWDA, which defined the term ‘respondent’ as an ‘adult male.’ The primary issues were whether this definition should include any person in a domestic relationship and whether it violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which ensures equality before the law.
The case originated when Kusum Narottam Harsora and her mother, Pushpa Narottam Harsora, filed a complaint under the PWDA on April 3, 2007, against Kusum's brother, sister-in-law, and two sisters, accusing them of various acts of domestic violence. The complaint was initially withdrawn but later refiled. On January 5, 2012, the metropolitan magistrate dismissed the complaints, ruling that Section 2(q) read with Section 2(a) of the PWDA could only be applied against adult males. On February 15, 2012, the Bombay High Court interpreted Section 2(q) to include female relatives as potential respondents, thus expanding the scope of the Act.
Prior to the enactment of the PWDA, remedies for domestic violence were primarily available under criminal law, specifically under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which addresses cruelty by a husband or his relatives. The PWDA was introduced to provide civil law remedies, aiming to protect women from domestic violence and prevent its occurrence.
The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized the legislative intent of the PWDA, which is to afford the widest possible protection to women from domestic violence. The Court observed that the Act’s objective was to protect women from violence by any person, male or female, within a domestic relationship or shared household. The inclusion of the term ‘adult male’ restricted the scope of protection and was inconsistent with the Act's purpose.
The Court noted that violence could be perpetrated by women as well, whether physical, sexual, verbal, or economic. It pointed out that limiting the definition of 'respondent' to adult males created an anomaly where individuals under the age of 18 could not be held accountable for domestic violence. This restriction was contrary to the intent of providing comprehensive protection to women.
The Court also referenced the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, where 'respondent' is defined broadly as any person against whom a complaint is made. Similarly, the Delhi High Court, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. State and Anr., held that a mother-in-law could file a complaint against a daughter-in-law under the PWDA, and the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition against this judgment, reinforcing the broad interpretation of 'respondent.'
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of severability, which allows for the removal of unconstitutional parts of a statute without invalidating the entire law. By striking down the expression 'adult male' in Section 2(q), the Court ensured that the remaining provisions of the PWDA remained effective and aligned with the legislative intent.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Bombay High Court's judgment, declaring that the term 'adult male' in Section 2(q) of the PWDA was unconstitutional as it violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The removal of this term expanded the definition of 'respondent' to include any person, regardless of gender or age, in a domestic relationship with the complainant. This decision ensured that the PWDA could achieve its intended objective of providing comprehensive protection to women from domestic violence.
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